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Abstract :  The central purpose of this paper is to examine the incentive contract as an 
equilibrium phenomenon. We analyse a model of vertical differentiation in which we deal 
with the strategic role of the competitor’s decisions in a successive duopoly. Is it better for 
a processor to offer an incentive contract to an upstream producer or the spot market? We 
determine the equilibrium of a game in which the processors simultaneously decide 
whether to offer an incentive contract or to continue at the spot market to acquire their 
input. Our results show that under successive duopoly, offering an incentive contract 
constitutes the unique equilibrium solution, which highlights the incentive contract 
persistence.  
Keywords:  incentive contract, moral hazard, successive duopoly, equilibrium  
 
1 Introduction 
According to principal-agent theory, incentive contracts (i.e., contracts that tie 
compensation to performance) are needed to elicit “effort” from agents to perform 
tasks that are valuable to the principal, but onerous to the agent (Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1992). There are many examples of incentive contracts used in practice, 
such as share tenancy in agriculture (e.g., Otsuka, Chuma & Hayami, 1992; Laffont 
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& Matoussi, 1995), managerial compensation (e.g., Lemmon, Schallheim & Zender, 
2000; Murphy, 1986), and franchising (e.g., Lafontaine, 1992; Lafontaine & Shaw, 
1999).  
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) have shown that, where contracting is repeated 
many times and the agent has discretion in actions including the level and timing 
of effort, the structure of the optimal pay scheme is linear in the observed 
principal´s payoff. Hence, in vertical relationships with moral hazard the linear 
incentive contract is preferred to successive monopoly at the spot market. The 
reason for this is that the linear incentive contract aligns the individual incentives 
with their joint-surplus maximizing interests by trading off some of the risk sharing 
benefits for provision of incentives.  
Can we expect the same result in the case of successive oligopolies? As the 
introduction of strategic behavior changes some relevant features of market 
competition, it cannot be presumed that the conclusions for successive monopoly  
carry over to successive oligopolies. In this paper, we focus on studying whether 
the above result holds for the case of successive duopoly.  
Pioneering studies by Stiglitz (1974), Holmstrom (1979) and Shavell (1979) within 
the principal-agent framework have emphasized the role of risk sharing and 
incentive alignment as possible motivations for incentive contracts. Since these 
early contributions, the incentive contract has received more and more attention. 
In fact, many analysis have modelled the incentive contract in different contexts, 
such as monitoring (Baiman & Demski, 1980; Agrawal, 2002), tournaments 
(Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Holmstrom, 1982; Green & Stokey, 1983; Mookerjee 
1984; Knoeber & Thurman, 1995; Rankin & Sayre, 2000, Hueth & Ligon, 2001), 
repeated agency contexts (Lambert, 1983; Rubinstein & Yaari, 1983; Radner, 
1985; Rogerson, 1985; Spear & Srivastava, 1987; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1990; Ma, 
1994; Matthews, 1995; Wickelgren, 2003), and agency models with several 
principal and agents (Barros & Macho-Stadler, 1998; Ray & Singh, 2001; Serfes, 
2005; Dam & Pérez-Castrillo, 2006). Although all these models have provided a 
better understanding of the incentive contract under different settings, to the best 
of our knowledge there are no studies that have paid attention to the strategic 
implications of the principals´ choices. That is, if contracts are chosen strategically, 
taking into account, among other things, market competitive forces.   
 
doi:10.3926/jiem.2009.v2n1.p208-259  ©© JIEM, 2009 – 2(1): 208-259 – ISSN: 2013-0953 
 
Successive duopoly under moral hazard: Will incentive contracts persist? 210 
M. Fernández-Olmos; J. Rosell Martínez; M.A. Espitia Escuer; L. M. Marín Vinuesa 
While it is difficult to find studies of the incentive contract in presence of market 
competition, there is no disputing the growing interest in vertical integration. The 
earliest literature in this field treated the case of successive duopoly without 
uncertainty. Greenhut and Ohta (1979) concluded that for a succesive duopoly at 
each stage, producing a homogenous product, an integrated duopoly was the 
equilibrium structure. If the products are differentiated, Bonnano and Vickers 
(1988) showed that vertical separation is an equilibrium structure. Later 
contributions investigated the integration between Cournot oligopolists in both the 
upstream and downstream stages. When the number of oligopolists is equal in both 
industries, Greenhut and Ohta´s conclusions can be extended to successive 
oligopoly. However, these conclusions do not remain when the number of firms in 
each industry is unequal. In this last case, emergence of vertical integration rarely 
is the unique dominant strategy (Abiru, Nahata, Raychaudhuri & Waterson, 1998). 
Hence, the vertical integration as an equilibrium structure is sensitive to the 
specific conditions of market competition. 
The purpose of this paper is to theoretically examine whether the incentive 
contract can emerge as an equilibrium outcome in vertical relationship with 
upstream and downstream competition under moral hazard. We consider a model 
of horizontal and vertical differentiation with two processors and two primary 
producers. We determine the equilibrium of a game in which the processors 
simultaneously decide whether to offer an incentive contract or to continue at the 
spot market to acquire their input. Our results show that, with successive 
duopolies, it is always a dominant strategy for each processor to offer an incentive 
contract to one producer. Thus, in equilibrium, both processors offer an incentive 
contract.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 
introduces the concept of equilibrium and the equilibrium results. A summary and 
concluding remarks are in Section 4. All proofs are relegated to Appendix. 
2 The model 
We consider a model with two identical upstream producers,  and , who 
supply the essential input used by two identical downstream producers,  and 
, (“the processors” hereinafter). We suppose that one unit of input is needed to 
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produce one unit of output and there is no other input. Likewise, inputs from 
different producers will yield a final product whose quality is a weighted average of 
the quality of its inputs. We assume for simplicity that there are no processing 
costs.  
The processors, risk-neutral, are quantity-setting (Cournot) competitors, producing 
a differentiated product. The differentiation can be vertical and horizontal. The 
inverse demand function for processor i´s product, , is assumed to be 
linear:  
 
where  is the price of the output,  is the quantity and  denotes the quality of 
the output of processor i. The parameter  implies that the goods are 
substitutes.  
Both producers are risk-averse. As is routinely assumed in the agency literature, 
we assume linear mean-variance risk preferences of constant absolute risk 
aversion. Each producer A, A=U1, U2 decides his quantity xA and his effort eA in 
quality. The quality of the input, , is specified by the following expression:
where  is a random variable normally distributed with mean 1 and 
variance . The cost of producing the input is , with c>0.  
Each processor can acquire his input in the spot market (we denote by M this 
strategy) or by offering an incentive contract (I) to an upstream producer. We 
assume that the incentive contract is exclusive, that is, a processor can only 
contract with a producer and viceverse. Moreover, if a producer accepts the 
incentive contract, he can not supply his input at the spot market. Following 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), we consider that the structure of the incentive 
contract is linear in the observed processor´s revenue This implies a two-part 
compensation scheme consisting of (i) a fixed payment, , that is independent of 
the observed revenue, and (ii) an incentive payment that amounts to a positive 
share, , of the observed revenue.  
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3 The structure of the game 
As we mentioned earlier, the main objective of this paper is to determine the 
equilibrium governance mechanism in the vertical relationship. To this end, we 
consider a two-stage game. In the first stage, the processors, simultaneously, 
decide whether to offer an incentive contract (I) or to remain at the spot market 
(M) (See Figure 1). They take their decisions based on the anticipated expected 
profits resulting from the second stage. In the second stage, the processor´s 
problem depends on the governance mechanism structure which results from the 
first stage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
processor i´s expected profit when he chooses the strategy g1 and the other processor 
chooses the strategy g2, g1=M,I, g2=M,I 
 
Figure 1. “Processors´ decisions in the first stage”. 
As we see in the Figure 1, with two processors, there are three possible structures 
of governance forms in this second stage. In the first, denoted by non incentive 
contract structure, both upstream producers and processors operate independently 
at the spot market.  Producers set a price for the input, which processors buy at 
the spot market, transform it into output and compete in quantities in the 
downstream market. The producers, simultaneously, decide on their effort to 
(  (   (   (  
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produce quality input and quantity input. In doing so, they face the derived 
demand for the upstream product anticipated from the decisions of the processors. 
In the downstream stage, the processors simultaneously decide on the quantity of 
the final good, taking as given the price of the upstream good they use as input 
and the consumer demand for the final good. Figure 2 illustrates the prices set by 
upstream producers to processors.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
 
Figure 2. “Competition under non incentive contract structure”. 
In the second structure, denoted by asymmetric incentive structure, a pair 
processor-producer remains at the spot market and the other pair set an incentive 
contract. In the incentive contract, the processor delegates the quantity and quality 
decisions to his contracting producer and determines the compensation scheme (α, 
β). The producer receives a payoff: α+ βy, where α and β are constant, β≥0, and y 
is the processor´s revenue. The processor selects α so that the producer gets only 
his reservation utility. We assume that the producer accepts any incentive contract 
that gives him a payoff at least as great as what he would get in his best 
alternative. In this case, if he refuses to signs up the incentive contract, he will 
obtain the resulting from competition in the spot market with successive duopoly. 
Figure 3 illustrates the asymmetric incentive contract structure: the dashed box 
represents the contractual relationship between a processor and a producer.  
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 Figure 3. “Competition under asymmetric incentive contract structure”. 
Finally, in the third structure, denoted by symmetric incentive structure, both pairs 
processor-producer set an incentive contract. The continuation game proceeds in 
the same way as the in the incentive contract in the previous structure, with the 
exception that the producer´s reservation utility is now different. A pair of 
contracts will be accepted by the producers if they can get at least the certainty 
equivalent resulting from the spot market in the previous structure (case ii). Figure 
4 illustrates the structure under symmetric incentive contract. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4. “Competition under symmetric incentive contract structure”. 
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3.1 The expected profits of the structures 
We are interested in characterizing the subgame-perfect Nash-equilibria. As usual, 
we solve the game by backward induction.  
Case (i): Non incentive contract structure 
We solve first the structure where both processors acquire their input at the spot 
market prices. The analysis is symmetrical for both processors. We denote by xiA 
the quantity of input acquired by processor i from the upstream producer A, 
A=U1,U2, i= D1, D2 . We solve the subgame by backward induction. Then, we 
start from period 2, in which given the input prices, , processor , chooses his 
quantity to maximize its expected profits : 
   
where  
 
which, after substitutions, gives 
  (1) 
The first order condition of this problem yields: 
 A=U1, U2     (2) 
Aggregation of (2) across the demands for producer A from the processors yields:  
         
In the first period, each producer A, A=U1,U2, maximizes his certainty equivalent 
 by solving the following problem:  
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          (3)  
where ρ is producers´ constant absolute risk aversion and the variance of µ. 
From the first order conditions of this problem, we get the equilibrium values of the 
input: 
            
Substituting these values in Eqs. 1 and 3 we get the certainty equivalents for each 
processor and producer: 
        (4) 
             
Case (ii): Asymmetric incentive contract structure 
Processor i, i=D1,D2 decides to offer an incentive contract to producer A, 
A=U1,U2, and the other processor j, j≠i, j=D1,D2 and producer B, B≠A B=U1,U2 
continue at the spot market. The important thing to recall is that the incentive 
contract means exclusivity for the processor and the producer.  
In this subgame, the reservation utility is the certainty-equivalent that he would 
obtain at the Spot Market with two processors and two producers, that is, .  
To determine the profits of each processor, we must simultaneously consider both 
processors´ problems to solve the reactions functions.  
The processor i would maximize his expected profit by choosing αi and βi, subject to 
the incentive rationality and the incentive compatibility constraint of the producer 
A: 
   (5) 
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s.t. :   (6) 
 (7) 
Since processor i only contracts with producer A, it is obvious that qi=xA and 
E(Si)=E(sA)=eA. Similarly, the producer B is the only offerer of input, which implies 
qj=xB and E(Sj)=E(sB)=eB. 
The problem optimization in equation (5) and (7) can be solved sequentially. First, 
we begin with equation 7, which, after substitutions, gives: 
 
First order conditions yield the following reaction functions in quantity and quality:  
        (8a) 
         (8b) 
Paralelally, in the spot market we proceed in the same manner as in the earlier 
case.  
Proceeding through backward induction, the processor j solves the following 
problem: 
  
which, after substitutions, gives 
 
Optimization of this equation yields: 
 
with  
and the producer B decides  and  to: 
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From the first order conditions, we obtain:   
        (9a) 
         (9b) 
Solving the equations 8a and 9a simultaneously we get 
      (10a) 
       (10b) 
Constraint 6, which is binding, implies 
 (11) 
Finally, substituting (11) and (10a) into (5) and maximizing with respect to βi, it 
may be shown that  
 
Finding the value of the incentive parameter, we obtain: 
    
We omit the other solution of the square root because if has not economic sense. 
As we expected, the properties of the incentive parameter are the standard in the 
agency literature. That is, 0  and . 
Now, the processors expected profits and producers certainty equivalents in each 
mechanism can be derived:  
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with      
i=D1,D2  j ≠ i    j=D1,D2  A=U1,U2  A≠B  B=U1,U2 
Case (iii): Symmetric incentive structure 
Consider now the case when both processors offer an incentive contract, that is 
processor i, i=D1,D2 offers an incentive contract to producer A, A=U1,U2. We first 
determine the producer A´s reservation utility, A=U1,U2, which is the certainty 
equivalent from the producer at the spot market in the previous structure: 
   
Since processor i only contracts with producer , is obvious that  and 
. To determine the expected profits of each processor, we proceed in 
the same manner as in the incentive contract of the case (ii). First, we solve the 
incentive rationality constraint of the producer A: 
 
which, after substitutions, gives 
 
The optimal solutions to this problem are:  
              (12) 
substituting these values of xA and eA in producer A´s incentive compatibility 
constraint, the value of α is obtained. Finally, we substitute all these values in 
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producer i´s problem and maximize with respect to βi, obtaining the same value of 
βi than in the case (ii). Then, it is easily verified that the processor i´s expected 
profit is  
  
The game outcomes are summarized in Table 1.  
Strategies Output quantity Expected quality output Processor expected profits 
(M,M)    
(M,I)    
(I,M)    
(I,I)    
 
where  is 
defined as 
  
 
where  is 
defined as 
 
Table 1. “Game outcomes”. 
3.2 The equilibrium of the game 
Having determined the processor´s expected profits in each structure, we proceed 
now to find their equilibrium strategies. The payoffs matrix is summarized in Figure 
5.  
Since the two processors are symmetric, the equilibrium profits of these two 
processors are equal, i.e., , , ,  
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• Proposition: With successive duopolies, the unique equilibrium of the game is 
(I,I), that is, each processor offers one incentive contract to one upstream 
producer.  
• Proof: See Appendix 1 
     processor D2 
  Market Incentive Contract 
Market   
processor D1 Incentive 
Contract 
  
Figure 5. “Summary of the subgame of the incentive contract game”. 
In other words, a processor could increase his expected profits if he offers an 
incentive contract to a producer, no matter neither the level of the risk premium is 
nor the strategy the other processor chooses.  
Given that there exists a direct link between processor´s profit and quantity and 
quality produced, we already have an intuition concerning this result.  
Comparing the levels of quantity from table 1, it is easy to see that 
 i=D1,D2 
We find that when the processor chooses the incentive contract, his level of output 
is larger than the level he could produce when he buys the input at the spot 
market, no matter what the other processor chooses. As the quantity affects the 
risk premium borne by the producer, it is reasonable that the incentive contract 
induces more quantity than the spot market.  
Comparing the levels of expected quality from table 1, we have that 
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As the agency literature predicts, as the level of risk premium increases (it can be 
caused by uncertainty, , risk aversion, ρ, and the importance of quality in the 
price, ), it is more likely that the expected quality for a processor in the 
incentive contract will be greater than in the spot market, no matter what the other 
processor chooses. These results suggest that although the expected quality 
provided by the incentive contract is smaller than in the spot market under 
determined conditions (i.e., low levels of risk premium), the greater level of 
quantity obtained compensates this reduction in quality, obtaining always a greater 
expected profit than at the spot market.  
On balance, although the degree of competitiveness has changed from successive 
monopoly into successive duopoly, the symmetric incentive structure emerges as 
an unique equilibrium. Then, the standard result that the incentive contract 
persists holds under a market structure with two upstream and two downstream 
producers, in which the strategic effects do not affect the equilibrium structure. 
This absence of strategic effect is not unlike that found in a vertical integration 
related framework by Greenhut and Ohta (1979), when studying the equilibrium 
incentives to integrate vertically when successive monopoly would be the 
alternative. They find that an integrated duopoly is also the equilibrium when 
successive monopoly would be the alternative. 
4 Conclusions 
By taking into account the competitor’s decisions, we take a further step towards 
understanding the incentive contract choice in vertical relationships with moral 
hazard.   
We have presented a model of vertical relationship in which upstream producers 
sell differentiated inputs and downstream producers process and sell them to 
consumers, and we have analysed the mechanisms each processor chooses to 
obtain the input needed to produce their goods. 
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to address the question of 
incentive contract versus spot market in presence of successive duopoly. In 
particular, we consider a two-stage game. In the first stage, processors decide 
simultaneously whether or not to set an incentive contract (versus spot market). 
The second stage is the stage in which input producers choose their levels of 
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quantity and quality based on the industry structure developed in the first stage. 
With the help of the subgame-perfect Nash-equilibria, we conducted the study of 
the equilibrium structures. 
This paper shows that, under successive duopoly, offering an incentive contract 
constitutes the unique equilibrium solution, which highlights the incentive contract 
persistence. This result is consistent with the evidence concerning vertical 
integration.  
The exercise throws some light on the relative importance of analysing the 
quantity/quality trade-off and successive duopoly in the analysis of the optimality 
in market versus incentive contract choice. We can not conclude from our results 
that the mechanism that provides a greater level of quality is always the most 
efficient mechanism.  
In the event that managerial policy is geared towards increasing the quality in the 
inputs markets, the policy makers could strive to incentive growers to produce 
quality by regulating the specified maximum quantity. However, the situation is 
complicated by the fact that in order to induce input producers to produce quality, 
they must be offered a compensation for the increase in cost associated with it. 
And if this compensation for cost increases is not associated with higher spot 
prices, it is difficult that input producers can receive it. The alternative, and more 
realistic, strategy for primary producers and processors is to think how to make 
that consumers perceive the quality and are willing to pay more for it. Creating a 
Quality Certified Brand could be a possibility given that it provides consumers with 
a better understanding of input quality.  
This study has important limitations that imply caution in generalizing the findings. 
As for the number of processors considered, our results hinge on the fact there are 
only two upstream and downstream competitors. On the basis of previous work, it 
seems reasonable to conjecture that the possibility of including more processors at 
the spot market will make the spot market more favorable. In this case, although 
processors are identical, our intuition is that asymmetric incentive structures could 
emerge as equilibrium structures, which would be consistent with the contractual 
evidence. Then, it could be an interesting topic for future research to extend the 
model to include multiple operators.  
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Likewise, our results depend on the way we model the market interaction between 
the processors with incentive contract and the processors at the spot market. We 
must emphasize that the possibility of processors with an incentive contract buying 
at the spot market is not considered in this paper. However, processors might 
choose to purchase their inputs from independent upstream producers for strategic 
reasons, for example, to raise the rivals´ input cost. Then, another interesting 
extension would be to allow processors with an incentive contract to freely trade 
with independent upstream producers and analyse if the raising-rivals´ costs 
strategy influences the nature of incentive contract equilibria. 
One limitation of this analysis is that all processors and primary producers are 
assumed identical. On the basic of previous work, for example Hendrikse (2007), it 
seems reasonable to conjecture that the possibility of including heterogeneous 
participants would not influence our qualitative results. However, the analytical 
difficulties associated with this issue would increase considerably.  This limitation 
will be considered in future research efforts.  
Appendix  
Proof of Proposition: We need to show that the pair of strategies (I,I) is the 
unique equilibrium of the game.   
The pair of strategies (I,I) will be an equilibrium if and only if inequality 
(A1) and (A2) hold: 
(A1)   i=D1,D2 
(A2)  
Proof of inequality A1 
Replacing the values of and  (see table 1) we have 
  
where   is defined as  
  
and 
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 as   
To verify that this expression is positive, we first show that . 
Numerical methods show that 
 
if and only if  which is always true.  
Finally, numerical methods show that 
 
if and only if  
Since , this inequality is always true. Therefore, inequality A1 holds.  
Proof of inequality A2 
Replacing the values of and  (see table 1) we have 
  
where   is defined as 
  
and  
 as     
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The identification of the sign of is straightforward. From the previous 
proof, we know that . Moreover, it is easy to verify that 
  
if and only if  
Since , this inequality is always true. Thus, inequality A2 holds.  
This completes the proof of proposition.  
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